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Risk-Return Profiles of New Ventures:
An Empirical Study
Robert H. Keeley
and Lassaad A. Turki

This study examines how risk evolves in private, venture capital backed
companies. It finds that the stochastic Ito processes assumed for public companies
probably apply to young, private companies as well. However, the parameters,
drift rate and standard deviation, are generally higher. Venture capitalists have
viewed companies as evolving through stages, and this study assesses the
probabilities of success and failure at each stage. The underlying process of price
evolution appears much smoother than the stage model may suggest. The
valuation mediods developed for public securities, including option pricing,
should apply to private companies as well. This study is a step toward measuring
the needed parameters.

1. INTRODUCTION
This is an investigation of the evolution of risk in startup companies. It
focuses on companies financed with venture capital, companies which aspire
to become publicly held at some point. Most will not become public, but
those which do presumably will exhibit the relatively stationary risk
characteristics typical of public companies—once they have become seasoned
public issues. The questions for this paper are:
How to describe the risk of a startup and how to measure it;
Whether the new company moves through definable stages, and if so
how the transitions affect its risk;
Measuring risks and associated changes in value of companies which
are privately held;
How to describe the evolution of risk as a company matures and
eventually becomes publicly-held, presumably exhibiting the relatively
stationary risk properties, which other studies have found for public
companies (e.g. Blume, [3]; Fama and MacBeth, [5]).
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Startup companies have received considerable attention in fields aside
from finance. The interest stems from findings that new companies are major
creators of new jobs in the United States, and of new industries such as work
stations, personal computers, and biotechnology. If new corporate ventures,
which are less observable but have the same underlying characteristics, are
added to independent startups, their combined influence on growth and
technological progress is very large indeed. A specialized financial
intermediary, venture capital, has emerged in the last thirty years to meet
the needs of some startup companies, and has been studied as part of the
broader issue of financial intermediation (Amit et. al. [1]; Chan [4]). But the
theoretical and empirical work which led to the Capital Asset Pricing Model,
to Option Pricing and to their many extensions has not been applied to new
companies. T hat is, we have no idea whether startup companies come close
enough to meeting the requirements of existing valuation models that those
models may be useful for valuing startups; nor do we have any estimates
of the relevant parameters (beta coefficients, variances and the like). Two
reasons lie behind the neglect of startup companies by financial researchers
interested in security prices:
•
•

Lack of data: the value of startup companies is not easily observed,
because they trade infrequently and on private markets.
Low priority: their aggregate value is small compared to the public
market (the venture capital community manages about $30 billion in
funds, a little over 1 percent of the value of public equities).

We believe the first problem can be solved, at least partially. Venture
capitalists have been investing in over 200 startups per year for at least a
decade; so a database of at least a few hundred transactions could be
assembled. Although this inevitably falls far short of the detail available in,
say, the daily CRSP tapes, it may be enough to make some rough inferences.
The low priority accorded to startups by financial researchers may be
misplaced. Many corporate investments in plant and equipment, as well as
in research and development, have the characteristics of a startup; namely,
the need to make a series of investments before the project becomes a cash
generator, high risks associated with a new technology and a new market,
and the potential for rapid growth if the project succeeds. In fact, these new
venture investments are precisely the ones that U.S. companies have been
accused of avoiding. Such investments pose difficulties for traditional
discounted cash flow methods using CAPM derived discount rates. Their
expected cash flows are hard to assess, because of wide variance. The character
of the project changes rapidly over its first few years. And the investment
is a form of call option, which requires a series of payments in order to keep
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the option alive. Because it is an option, traditional risk adjustments are not
sufficient; and because it is a compound option, requiring multiple
investments, the simpler option formulae are not suitable either. If the project
succeeds, its value will be heavily tied to “growth options” (Pindyck [10])
as well as to its observable cash flow. And, the relevant risk parameters, beta
coefficients and variances in value, are even less observable than they are for
a typical investment, where an analogous public security often exists.
This study is an exploratory step toward describing the “price process”
(i.e. the equation describing the way the price changes over time) of a startup
company. Section 2 identifies stages of development through which new
companies pass, and estimates the probability of success at each stage. The
latter estimates are based on a sample of 203 firms taken from the portfolios
of three venture capital firms. Section 3 theorizes about the underlying
stochastic process which produces the observed probabilities of success at
each stage. Section 4 describes the sample of prices. Section 5 makes some
rough estimates of risks and returns at each stage and discusses the
implications regarding the underlying stochastic process. Section 6
summarizes the findings.
2. STAGES o r DEVELOPMENT IN A NEW COMPANY
Researchers recognize that a new company changes dramatically as it
develops a product, introduces it into the market, and, if successful, builds
a self-supporting organization. They have proposed various taxonomies of
which we will briefly discuss three. Bell [2] proposes a six-step progression
based on his personal exposure to the computer industry over a 30 yeair period:

•
•
•
•

Concept
Seed
Product Development
Market Calibration (Early marketing)
Market Expansion
Steady State

Ruhnka and Young [12] survey 73 venture capital investors, asking
them to differentiate among stages of development, if appropriate, and to
describe the stages as to characteristics, goals, and risks. Most responses
identify 5 stages, although the characteristics of the stages vary considerably
depending on the respondent. The most common response identifies all
of Bell’s stages except “Concept,” which typically pre-dates a venture
capitalist’s involvement. Kazanjian [7] develops a four stage model.
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positing that companies deal with a series of dominant problems: first with
product development, then production, then sales and finally with
organizational development. His survey of 105 young companies supports
the idea diat a CEO’s priorities shift over time, generally following the stages
which he proposes.
Each of the three describes events marking the boundaries of a stage.
Ruhnka and Young’s boundaries vary depending on the respondent, but
generally speaking all three recognize introduction of the first product as a
dear transition, and divide the first few years of sales into two parts: establishing
a toehold, eind then building up to a solid position. They also agree on a final
stage in which a company becomes an established competitor. Thus the
differences among Bell, Ruhnka and Young, and Kazanjian arise from events
prior to introducing the first product. Bell has three stages, Ruhnka and Young
have two, and Kazanjian has one (conception and development).
None of the three discusses in detail what happens in the event of failure.
Kazanjian views a company as cycling within a stage until it succeeds. Bell
also allows cycling, as well as retreat to the previous stage, or possibly going
out of business. Ruhnka and Young simply catalog the likely causes of failure.
These three studies, using different sources of data, agree closely enough
that we began with their sequence (using the five stage version) for a
successful company, and then tested its descriptiveness by asking a few
venture capitalists to use it to categorize a random sample of their
investments. We also filled out the sequences for failures by asking the
venture capitalists to trace the possible paths of several failures. The resulting
fraimework is shown in Figure 1. A new company may begin at either the
seed (I) or startup (II) stage, 95 percent in our sample began at II. If successful
at developing a product, it then moves to early marketing (III), and, if its
success continues, it goes to early expansion (IV). If not successful, it may
seek a new direction (V-1 or V-2) or close down (VI). A company which
succeeds with early expansion (IV-1) may move on to sustained success (VII1)—at which point it has typically become a major force in its industry, and
can be viewed as equivalent to its older competitors; or, it may have a setback
(VII-2) and need to attempt a turnaround. Other branches of Figure 1—VIII
through XII—deal with the company’s choices when it does not succeed at
various points in its history.
Table 1 describes each of the stages of Figure 1 and identifies the event
that signals completion of a stage.
Theories and empirical studies of equity price movements have never
concerned themselves with stages of development, in part because they
concentrate on mature firms. They usually assume a firm’s price is in some
steady state characterized by a drift rate and a variance (which may be a
function of the firm’s characteristics and the variance of the market).
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Organization researchers may look at the same firms and see evidence of large
changes in structure and management methods, similar to some of the
changes undergone by startups (e.g. Miller and Mintzberg, [9]). But such
changes will not necessarily affect the underlying equity price process. Thus,
our first question is whether a sequence of transitions, as described in Table
1, requires a departure from the common assumption that a company’s stock
price follows an Ito process with a constant drift and variance.
3. TH E PRICE PROCESS FOR A NEW VENTURE
New venture financing differs from a typical transaction in common stock
in some notable ways:
Stepwise Investing: A new venture usually requires financial support
for its first few years, and investors typically supply that support in a series
of steps. With each financing we may observe a value for the venture. In
most cases, at least when the venture does well, each new step involves
investment by some new investor as well as the old ones.
Financing Steps vs. Stages of Development: The financing steps do
not necessarily coincide with the stages of a company’s development,
described in section 2. However, venture capitalists have stated that they try
to finance one stage at a time, and for the purposes of this paper, financings
will be treated as occurring at the boundaries between stages. When
transactions occur in the middle of a stage (an infrequent event), we will
ignore them, using only the ones which occur roughly at the boundaries
of stages. When a company moves through a stage without a financing, we
will leave out that company, in order to avoid observing a return which
clearly combines two stages.
Financing Prices vs. Market Prices: In this paper we will treat the price
at each step as a market price, the price which would exist if a large number
of well informed buyers and issuers existed and were able to transact at no
cost. That view may be reasonable when a new investor participates, but not
all of our observed prices stem from such transactions. And, we will often
not know whether a new investor participated. We would expect that the
price of an “insider only” transaction would not exceed the price which an
outsider would pay, and it may be less.
Rates of return: Since calculation of a rate of return requires two price
observations, a “market” return requires that a new investor participate in
two consecutive financings. Observed returns, which may not have new
investors in both transactions, may deviate from market returns, which by
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definition require a new investor in both transactions. In addition, a
company’s first financing may be at a sub-market price, because the company
may have imprecise knov^^ledge of market prices. Beyond the first investment
its investors will guard against “bargain” purchases by outsiders. In another
study (Keeley and Turki [8]) we classified a sample of 186 venture capital
transactions as market, inside or unknown, and found that non-market
returns differed from market returns in the directions one would expect, but
the above-market returns offset the below-market returns. That is, using
transactions, some of which do not have new investors, does not bias the
data. It introduces extra variance in the returns, however.
Venture Capital Stock Purchases as Options on the Underlying
Company: Because a few financing steps will be needed before a company
is self sustaining, an early stock purchase is a type of option. It gives the
buyer the right to make subsequent investments and eventually to own the
self sustaining company. Referring to Figure 1, and assuming that failure
at 1-2, II-2, III-2, IV-2, or VII-2 all result in a fixed payoff (possibly zero),
the value of the company’s stock can be modeled using Geske’s [6] expression
for a compound option . Symbolically,
V(t) = Value of the underlying company; that is, the present value of
the company discounted at the time when it needs no further
financing—tvii-i+. The “+ ” means the instant after tvii-i.
K(i) = Investments required at i= ti, tn, tm, tiv,tvii.
S(t) = Value of the company’s equity
= f{V(t);K(i), tvu>i>t)
If we make the common assumptions that V(t) follows an Ito process, that
markets are dynamically complete, that transactions are costless and the
interest rate (r) is constant, then S(t) also follows an Ito process.
dV = /iv(V ,t) dt + av(V ,t) dB where B is a Standard Brownian Motion.
dS = Us dt + Os dB
where
Ms ■“ MvSv + ^
O^s

Ov Sw + St

Sv Cfv

are respectively the first and second partial derivatives of S with
respect to V, and the paurtial derivative of S with respect to t.
(Sv,Sw,St)
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As a redundant security the time path of S will follow the familiar partial
differential equation:
CTv Sw + rVSv + St — rS = 0

If V does not follow an Ito process, then the stock price S will not follow
one either. Ito processes are widely assumed for public stocks, and V(t) will
be public beyond step VII-1. This suggests that V(t) may be an Ito process
prior to going public, although it will not be observable. On the other hand,
the tendency of venture capitalists to identify discrete stages seems in keeping
with a process that incorporates large jumps in prices. Although not
observable, V(t) will be the discounted value of E[V(tvii-i)], where E[] refers
to an expectation. Young, public companies usually pay no dividends, so
V(tvii-i) will itself be a discounted value of some later (say at t=T) expected
value of the stock. If V(t) after tvii-i is an Ito process, as we observe with public
stocks, the updating of E[V(T)], say in the instant following tvii-i, must also
be an Ito process.
Prior to tvii-i, when the company is private, the value, V(t), will still
be the discounted value of E[V(T)]. If the updating of E[V(T)] follows an
Ito process after tvn- i, we might expect it to follow the same process before.
The act of going public does not change the nature of the business.
On the other hand, one may argue that very early in a company’s life,
a few events can make or break it. For example, the maker of a new data
storage device needs to secure a few large customers early to give it credibility,
and to establish its product as a de facto standard. The expected value of
its future cash flows, and therefore E[V(T)] as well, m ight jum p
discontinuously depending whether it wins or loses a given order early in
its life (say soon after tm). T hat is shortly after tm we may jum p E[V(T)],
the forecast of value at a much later date, up or down depending on whether
the company wins or loses a big, early order.
This study, an early, exploratory examination of the price processes of
new ventures, will try to assess whether V(t) may reasonably be assumed to
be an Ito process with a constant Vciriance. To do so it will use two primary
tests:
•

•

Do the outcomes at a stage (e.g. III-l and III-2 combined) distribute
themselves in a manner consistent with the continuous evolution of
value implied by an Ito process?
Does the variance observed for each stage tend to decline toward the
value observed for young, venture capital backed public companies (i.e.
companies which have reached stage VII-1)?
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The first test implies that combined rates of return for a stage will be
roughly normally distributed. III-l alone will have good returns, and III2 will have primarily low returns. But combining III-l and III-2 or IV-1 and
IV-2 w ill produce a distribution of outcom es w hich follows an
approximately normal distribution, if the underlying V(t) follows an Ito
process. If it does not, the combined distribution may be bimodal, or show
some other deviation from normality. A bimodal distribution seems
consistent with the venture capitalist’s tendency to identify successes and
failures, instead of saying the companies have a continuum of outcomes at
any stage.
The second test is consistent with an option that moves increasingly
into the money, as would be the case with a progression toward stage VII1. On the other hand, a small variance at the early stages would imply some
other sort of evolution, perhaps one in which uncertainty is resolved later
on.
4. DATA
The data sample consists of 203 firms obtained from three venture capital
funds that primarily invested in technology-oriented companies. For 142
firms, we had sufficient information to identify both the stages the firms went
through, up to the date of data collection, and payoffs at most of those stages.
For the remaining 61 firms, we obtained the firm’s outcome but were unable
to obtain the payoffs.
Most firms, 182, entered the sample at the startup stage (stage II), eleven
entered at the seed stage (I), nine at early marketing (III), and one at the early
expansion stage (IV). Furthermore, for the firms that were still in existence
at the time of data collection, we did not track their evolution beyond the
final outcomes of Figure 1.
Along any branch between two adjacent stages, say j and (j-i), read as
“i dash i” (e.g. II-1 or II-2), the firms are classified into three categories:
•
•
•

those firms entering the sample at stage (j-i), their number denoted by
n(enter(j-i));
those firms at stage (j-i), n(j-i);
those firms beyond stage (j-i), n(beyond(j-i)).

Letting i= l denote success and i=2 denote failure, the probability of success
at stage j is computed as:
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Prob(j - 1) =

~ ^) + n(beyond (j ~ 1) ~ n(enter (j - 1))
n(beyond j)

where:
j = I to X per Figure 1
The probability of failure at stage j is, therefore, given by:
Prob(j-2) = 1 - Prob(j-l)
The counts of companies at each stage are shown in Appendix A.
For the 142 firms on which payoff data were available, we collected 495
stock prices which correspond to the prices at the different stages. These prices
were mainly used to estimate the parameters of their generating process.
Assume that stock prices at each stage follow the same Ito Process^, that
is, a diffusion process, of the following simple form:
dS = jLiS dt + aS dB
where /x is the instantaneous drift per unit time,
is the instantaneous
variance per unit time, and B denotes a Standard Brownian motion in R.
Then, using Ito’s Lemma, one can show that the continuously compounded
rate of return r:
(St2 \

/

1

2 aM

where At=t2-ti and n refers to the normal distribution (~ means distributed
as). Then, as shown in Appendix B, the maximum likelihood estimators
(MLE) for ju and are given, respectively, by:
-M= ^1 -2
a +a
- 2 _ ^ Ati (ri — a f
^
i=i
N
where a. represents a weighted average of the continuously compounded rate
of returns ri such that:
« —^
'=1 2i=i Ati

where N is the sample size
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Since the MLE for
constructed as:

is a biased estimator, an unbiased estimator is

^2 ^ ^ Ati in - a f
i=i

N -

1

Finally, to check that stock prices follow a stochastic process of the type
described above, we constructed histograms from the z-scores of the
continuously compounded returns and checked if the latter are normally
distributed as suggested. The z-score for a given return was obtained using
the following equation:
z-score =
o / V Ati

5.

RESULTS

Figure 2 presents the estimated probabilities at each transition between
stages. For example, a company that begins at a seed stage (stage I) has an
85 percent likelihood of successfully moving on to stage II, startup. The
likelihood of successfully moving from stage II to stage III is 97 percent,
which implies that very few companies fail to develop their initial productonly 3 percent. The odds of success during initial marketing, stage III, fall
considerably to 60 percent. They improve to 77 percent for stage IV, early
expansion. T hat is, a venture capital backed company that reaches break
even, the test for exiting stage III, has a 77 percent chance of doubling its
sales soon thereafter. The last stage, stage VII of our model, when a company
becomes a major participant in its industry if it succeeds at that stage, has
a 64 percent chance of success.
M ultiplying the above probabilities gives the likelihood that a company,
starting at a seed stage, will become a major force in its industry. That figure
is (0.85 ) (0.97) (0.60) (0.77) (0.64) = 0.24. Thus, a seed stage company, based
on the experience of our sample, has a 24 percent chance of having
uninterrupted success during its early years. Of the 203 companies in the
sample, only 11 began with seed financings. The rest commenced with a
larger startup financing, and their implied likelihood of reaching VII-1 is
29 percent.
Considering events following a failure, V, VIII, IX and X, the
probabilities of a success generally lie below 0.40 (Following III-2, only 24
of 60 companies successfully completed the next stage; 18 closed without
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attempting a turnaround, and 18 turnaround efforts failed.) Any setback in
the first several stages, even when the company has achieved profitability,
apparently precludes a “fresh start,” in which the chance of success is as good
as ever.
A failure at a later stage, for example at VI, does not necessarily imply
that an early investment will lose money. T hat depends on the respective
gains and losses of each stage. Figure 3 shows those payoffs using the average
multiple of a hypothetical investment made at the beginning of a given stage.
For example, if a company fails at early marketing (III-2), but remains in
operation (V) the average multiple of an investment made at the start of early
marketing (III) is 0.562, a loss in value of 43.8 percent. The average time,
over which that multiple is earned, is 1.92 years.
From Figure 3 one can easily determine that only three outcomes lead
to an average multiplier greater than 1.0 for someone who invests at startup
(II). They are:
•
•
•

VII-1 with an average multiple of 24.16 which is realized after 6.48 years
and has a likelihood of 0.286.
VII-2 with an average multiple of 5.08 which is realized after 7.84 years
and has a likelihood of 0.162.
VIII-1 with an average multiple of 1.32 which is realized after 8.25 years
and has a likelihood of 0.052.

By tracing all branches an overall expected multiple and rate of return
can be determined for a portfolio of investments made at a given stage.
Similar returns can be determined for other investment points such as early
expansion (IV) or redirect (V). Table 2 summarizes the results of investing
at stages II, III, IV, V, or VII. They show that startups (II) had the highest
rate of return followed by early expansion stages (IV). When a company has
failed at a given stage, investments in a turnaround effort lead to negative
returns on the average for stages V, VIII, IX, and X (Table 2 shows results
for V only). Of course, some turncirounds have positive returns, but on the
average they do not.
Figure 3 shows that startup financings have a high multiple and a very
low failure rate (The same may be said of seed financings, but we will ignore
them because only 5 percent of our sample began with seed financings).
Although it may appear that investors earn high returns for assuming
minimal risks, success refers only to completion of design. Quite possibly
investors are assessing the potential market and the ability of the managers
during this stage. That is, they may be resolving risks beyond mere technical
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Table 2
Investment Performance vs. Stage of Investment

Investment Stage
Startup (II)
Early Marketing (III)
Early Expansion (IV)
Follow-On (VII)
Redirect (V)
Notes:

Number
in Sample

Expected
Multiple^

Annualized
Rate of
Return?'

Average
Holding
Time

171
165
78
36
42

7.89
3.44
2.82
1.76
0.12

38.1%
26.8%
29.6%
29.3%
-38.2%

6.4 years
5.2 years
4.0 years
2.2 years
4.4 years

= Prob (success @ i) X EM (stage i+) + Prob (failure @ i) X EM (stage i-), where EM denotes expected
multiple. That is, the expected multiples are computed by rolling back the tree in Figure 3.
"= (Expected Multiple)*'^*’'™"
-1

issues. More generally, dividing each stage into successes and failures creates
an appearance of a binary process, where one may not exist.
Instead of a binary separation, we may examine returns for all companies
at each stage. In particular, if private companies experience the same
processes as public companies, rates of return from stage II to III, or from
III to IV should be normally distributed, and distributions looking only at
successes (e.g. III-l) or failures (e.g. III-2) should be non-normal, because
they will be decidedly nonrandom samples of the underlying distribution.
Figure 4 displays histograms for the stages having reasonably large samples,
II, III, IV, and V, showing success/failure splits. The combined stage looks
decidedly more normal than the splits. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test fails to
reject normality in all four cases even at significance levels of 0.20. Thus,
the evidence fits the hypothesis of an underlying Brownian motion.
Some evidence exists for isolated jumps in value. Four cases fall beyond
the 0.001 significance level, considerably more than would be expected for
our sample of 325 returns. Two of those apply to one company, that first
jumped upward and then downward. Possibly that case resulted from
mispricing. Even so, the remaining two cases, both negative, suggest that
large changes occur occasionally.
The results do not imply a Brownian motion with constant variance
necessarily. Conceivably, the variation becomes large near the end of a stage.
T hat is, variance may change with time. Additionally, the option-like nature
of an investment in a new company means the variance will change
depending on the movement of the company’s value. However, the initial
evidence suggests that a stage represents a continuous unfolding of
information about the company’s prospects, not a bifurcation into a
successful and an unsuccessful path. The evidence also fits the view that a
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young private company and an established public company differ mainly
in the observability of their values, not in the underlying events which
determine how those values evolve.
Figure 5 estimates the parameters for the assumed Ito process at stages
II, III, IV; and V, for which the sample size is large enough to obtain
estimates. Two returns are shown: the drift of the process (jx) and the mean
of the implied normal distribution of returns (a = Ji 0.5a^), as well as
the standard deviation of the process (a). These estimates use continuous
com pounding at all stages. Drift rates and volatilities are higher than are
typical in public markets.
We view the data in Figure 5, particularly the standard deviations, as
valuable because they provide data which may allow the extension of
option pricing approaches to new ventures. The similarity of price
processes for public and private companies also suggests that our
parameters for startups may represent reasonable standards for new
ventures w ithin established companies as well.
The standard deviations of the process do not appear to evolve steadily.
They drop after the startup stage (II) but do not trend downward. The high
variation at the initial stage, 95 percent of our sample started at stage II,
and the high returns may reflect varying degrees of underpricing at the
initial transaction. At that point a company often has limited knowledge
about valuation; whereas, at all later points it has its own venture capitalist
experts as members of the board of directors. Additionally, in the absence
of an investor group a company often has little staying power, which hurts
its bargaining position. An appearance of underpricing may also result
if a low initial price serves to compensate investors for services that they
subsequently provide (e.g. expert advice, introductions to customers).
The standard deviations of these private early stage companies are above
those of venture capital backed startups, that have become public. Using
weekly data Punjabi [11] found standard deviations averaging about 55
percent per year for a sample of 48 such companies. Although higher, they
seem to be in a reasonable range, between 76 and 99 percent per year. The
higher variations for private companies, not yet mature enough for public
markets, may reflect the optionlike nature of early stage investments. They
may also stem from the inclusion of transactions in which no outside
investors participated, a process which we believe increases variation,
although it does not bias the averages (Keeley and Turki [8]). On the other
hand, the absence of trading diminishes any volume based volatility, which
would tend to raise the standard deviations of public companies vis-a-vis their
private counterparts.
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CONCLUSIONS

This study explores the nature of financial risks and returns in young, private
companies. Its primary objective is to compare the evolution of value in such
companies with the evolution found in public companies. Logic suggests
that the processes should be similar, regardless of the age of the company,
and this database of 203 venture capital backed start-ups provides empirical
support for that logic.
The stages of development, v^hich venture capitalists readily identify,
give an appearance of a binary process, characterized by large jumps up or
dov^n in value at infrequent intervals. Hov^ever, this database shows the
continuous variation of prices within a stage, supporting the view that their
evolution follows an Ito process, similar to that for public stocks.
The estimated standard deviations of the process lie above those of
slightly more mature, but otherwise similar, public companies, a result
which seems reasonable. The standard deviations do not drift steadily
downward to meet the values of public companies, as one might expect.
The data also provides evidence on the returns on venture capital
investments separated by stages. Previous data has generally reported on
venture capital portfolios, which are mixtures by stage, holding period,
and investment amount. The information from this database more closely
matches the nature of data on public securities. Returns, assuming the
investment is held until the final stage of the development “tree” outlined
in Figure 1, range from 38.1 percent per year for investments at stage II
to 26.8 percent per year for investments at stage III. Investments after a
company had suffered a setback show negative expected returns.
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APPENDIX B

Given that n is normally distributed with mean (jLt-0.5a^) and variance a /
Ati, then one can construct a likelihood function for an N-size sample as:
N

H VAt; exp _ Ati(ri - M
n
i=i
2a^

L(/i,a^,ri) = (27ra^)

The corresponding log likelihood function is:
logL(/i,a\ri) =
y-log(2ir) -

-

log(<,') + 1- I log (At,) - ^

The MLE for n and

I At, (r, - M+ 0.5oV

are the solutions to:

dn
dn

logL(M,

ri) = 0

That is,
1
i X - 2 Ati(r; - M+ 0.5a') = 0
2a
N
~

1 ^
~ 2(a')' 5

^
~ ^

^

1
~ ~
2a"

^
^ti(ri - M+ 0.5a') = i

Rearranging and solving for ju and a ' yields the desired results.
It is straightforward to show that the second order conditions are satisfied
by /i and a'. Mainly,
a'logL
a
a'logL
d{o^f

(9'logL
dixd{a2x)2

= 0

'liO

i=i
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